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Potential of Nanotechnology
The development of nanotechnology for biodefense holds much promise. Many laboratory groups have indicated that progress in both sensors and materials is ongoing and will contribute to the preservation of the environment, assistance to agriculture, enhancements in human health care, and security issues in the near future. This progress is not taking place in a vacuum. Many biodefense technologies will enable, and in turn be enabled by, nanotechnologies. Microelectronics, MEMS,
biotechnology, and traditional developments in chemistry will all come into play in this new field. Extensive use is being made of micro- and nanostructures to support or act as detectors. The unique properties of conducting polymers, thin films, nanoparticles, nanoscale surface features, DNAs, and protein structures are being exploited. Self-assembly offers an attractive route for some nanoscale components, although it will not solve all manufacturing problems given the variety of components and enabling requirements.
Limitations and Challenges
While the application of nanoscale components to biodefense holds much promise, challenges and limitations must be faced. Practical application of nanosensors and biosensors to widely distributed, inexpensive detector devices will require that laboratory designs be adapted to mass production techniques. Systems will still need to address power requirements (even though they are small) and communication issues, especially when signals must be sent across macroscale distances. Also, current microscale systems such as MEMS and microfluidics chip systems are just now maturing; nanoscale systems are likely to be a decade behind this maturity curve. In terms of technical challenges, nanoscale systems do not resolve difficult challenges in sampling large volumes of gases or liquids. Also, specific binding sites can be created for many molecules of concern, but the use of predesigned binding sites will not detect unexpected hazardous genetically modified molecules or organisms. The need to differentiate similar malignant and benign organisms such as related strains of bacteria accentuates the problems of specificity and generalized detectability. Although the bases of many biodefense-relevant sensors are biological binding or reactivity properties — such as the binding of antibodies to the bacterial and viral proteins they recognize or the inhibition of an enzyme by a nerve agent — sensors based on natural macromolecules have certain disadvantages. The use of biological molecules can introduce constraints in sensor operation. The need to keep biological molecules stable and active can produce limits on the operating conditions for sensors, their ruggedness, or the ease of their usage. As a result, nanoscale strategies to construct more stable structures that can mimic biological properties or recognize molecules not readily delivered by natural molecules can make important contributions to sensor improvement.
Conclusions
We do not wish to indulge in speculation on how far nanotechnology may push biodefense in the far future, but near-term predictions can be made. The integration of individual components will lead to relatively complicated materials and equipment architectures based on nanotechnology emerging from experiments currently in the laboratory. This will include functional clothing that may support the activities of rescue workers in a disaster, those who must remediate toxic sites, soldiers, police, and the public. Cheap, multifunctional and often tiny detectors will be distributed to monitor a wide variety of parameters from samples to be checked for environmental contamination to the status of individual health. Many examples of excellent laboratory research were highlighted and reviewed in this chapter. The large number of successful results indicates that many routes can and should be supported and explored in the near term for the development of nanotechnological biodefense measures.
The development of nanotechnology for biodefense holds much promise. Many laboratory groups have indicated that progress in both sensors and materials is ongoing and will contribute to the preservation of the environment, assistance to agriculture, enhancements in human health care, and security issues in the near future. This progress is not taking place in a vacuum. Many biodefense technologies will enable, and in turn be enabled by, nanotechnologies. Microelectronics, MEMS,
biotechnology, and traditional developments in chemistry will all come into play in this new field. Extensive use is being made of micro- and nanostructures to support or act as detectors. The unique properties of conducting polymers, thin films, nanoparticles, nanoscale surface features, DNAs, and protein structures are being exploited. Self-assembly offers an attractive route for some nanoscale components, although it will not solve all manufacturing problems given the variety of components and enabling requirements.
Limitations and Challenges
While the application of nanoscale components to biodefense holds much promise, challenges and limitations must be faced. Practical application of nanosensors and biosensors to widely distributed, inexpensive detector devices will require that laboratory designs be adapted to mass production techniques. Systems will still need to address power requirements (even though they are small) and communication issues, especially when signals must be sent across macroscale distances. Also, current microscale systems such as MEMS and microfluidics chip systems are just now maturing; nanoscale systems are likely to be a decade behind this maturity curve. In terms of technical challenges, nanoscale systems do not resolve difficult challenges in sampling large volumes of gases or liquids. Also, specific binding sites can be created for many molecules of concern, but the use of predesigned binding sites will not detect unexpected hazardous genetically modified molecules or organisms. The need to differentiate similar malignant and benign organisms such as related strains of bacteria accentuates the problems of specificity and generalized detectability. Although the bases of many biodefense-relevant sensors are biological binding or reactivity properties — such as the binding of antibodies to the bacterial and viral proteins they recognize or the inhibition of an enzyme by a nerve agent — sensors based on natural macromolecules have certain disadvantages. The use of biological molecules can introduce constraints in sensor operation. The need to keep biological molecules stable and active can produce limits on the operating conditions for sensors, their ruggedness, or the ease of their usage. As a result, nanoscale strategies to construct more stable structures that can mimic biological properties or recognize molecules not readily delivered by natural molecules can make important contributions to sensor improvement.
Conclusions
We do not wish to indulge in speculation on how far nanotechnology may push biodefense in the far future, but near-term predictions can be made. The integration of individual components will lead to relatively complicated materials and equipment architectures based on nanotechnology emerging from experiments currently in the laboratory. This will include functional clothing that may support the activities of rescue workers in a disaster, those who must remediate toxic sites, soldiers, police, and the public. Cheap, multifunctional and often tiny detectors will be distributed to monitor a wide variety of parameters from samples to be checked for environmental contamination to the status of individual health. Many examples of excellent laboratory research were highlighted and reviewed in this chapter. The large number of successful results indicates that many routes can and should be supported and explored in the near term for the development of nanotechnological biodefense measures.